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Abstract
Traditional models of sovereign debt assume that governments seek to maximize the long term
interests of their countries.We assume instead that governments borrow and default according to
their own political interests. In particular they often have limited horizons and are reluctant to
default strategically. This allows us to dene a maximum sustainable debt to GDP ratio,and
compute it as a function of the countrys fundamentals.
Abstract
Abstract
We nd that maximum sustainable debt varies a lot across countries, consistent with the notion of
country specic debt (in)tolerance.
Abstract
Actual debt ratios are below their maximum sustainable levels, as governments seeking further
terms in o¢ce fear debt-induced default
Abstract
that may jeopardize their prospects for reelection. The di¤erence between actual and maximum
sustainable debt ratios creates a margin of safety that allows governments to increase debt if neces-
sary with little corresponding increase in default risk.The probability of default climbs precipitously
once the margin of safety has been exhausted.
1 Introduction
Perhaps the dening characteristic of sovereign debt is its near total absence of enforcement mech-
anism: unlike the case for corporate debt, it is very di¢cult if not impossible for a creditor to seize
the assets of a defaulting sovereign. Rogo¤ (1999, p. 31) consequently has deemed the question
why, exactly, are debtor countries willing to make repayments of any kind to be the crux of
understanding international debt markets. Two answers to this question have been provided: the
threat to deny a defaulting country further access to debt markets (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981) and
that to impose direct sanctions on the country (Bulow and Rogo¤, 1989a, 1989b).1 Building on
these two answers, a number of papers have calibrated country debt-to-GDP ratios.2 It is probably
fair to say that they have fallen short of reproducing prevailing country debt levels.3
In the present paper, we revisit the issue of sovereign debt with a view to obtaining debt levels
that are perhaps closer to the cross-sectional evidence than may so far have been obtained. For
that purpose, we dispense with the two assumptions made by most existing papers, specically
a government with innite horizon that defaults strategically, to replace these with the opposite
assumptions of a government with horizon limited to its expected term in o¢ce that defaults only
when unable to service its debt.4
We show that our alternative assumptions more naturally result in government debt levels in
the vicinity of those observed in practice. A government whose horizon is limited to its expected
term in o¢ce naturally neglects possibly negative consequences of government borrowing that occur
beyond that term. A limited horizon government therefore can be expected to borrow more than
its innite horizon counterpart. High government demand for funds is met by high investor supply
of funds, as investors who do not fear strategic default recognize that the limit to lending stems
from the governments ability rather than willingness to service the debt: default occurs when
government income falls short of debt service requirements. Investors further recognize that a
governments ability to service existing debt depends on its ability to raise new debt: there is a
bubble-like property to government debt. Investors base their lending decisions on government
1Possible sanctions have ranged from trade sanctions to outright occupation in the age of gunboat diplomacy.
2See the literature review in Section 2.
3Cohen and Villemot (2013) report debt-to-GDP ratios ranging from 1.5% to 30%, which their own work extends
to 47%. Table 1 shows prevailing debt levels to be markedly higher for the vast majority of countries considered.
4These assumptions are justied below.
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disposable income, that is, that part of government income that could if necessary be directed
towards debt servicing: not all spending can be so directed, as the government must maintain
some minimum level of services and investment. Government disposable income is a fraction of
government income, itself a fraction of GDP. Thus, high ratios of debt to government income do
not necessarily translate into high debt to GDP ratios.
We initially consider the case of a myopic government whose concern extends only to its current
term in o¢ce. We characterize the governments maximum sustainable debt level and its associated
default probability as functions of the mean and variance of growth in government disposable
income, the ratio of government disposable income to government income and that of government
income to GDP, and the risk-free rate. Maximum sustainable debt varies across countries; it
can be viewed as a measure of a countrys debt tolerance: countries that have lower maximum
sustainable debt and/or higher associated default probability are, in the words of Reinhart, Rogo¤,
and Sevastano (2003), more debt intolerant. We then consider the case where the governments
concern extends beyond the current term, perhaps because the government may be reelected to
o¢ce. We show that the prospect of further terms in o¢ce induces the government to decrease
borrowing below its maximum sustainable value, in order not to jeopardize through default the
benets of being in o¢ce during these further terms. The default probability correspondingly
decreases.
We calibrate our model using IMF data over the period 1980-2011. Maximum sustainable debt
levels can be surprisingly large, attaining 224% of GDP for Austria, 222% for France, and 216%
for Sweden for example, under the admittedly arbitrary assumption that the ratio of government
disposable income to government income is 40%.5 These results may be due to relatively high mean
growth rates (2.1% for Austria and 2.2% for Sweden, but 1.4% for France), relatively low growth
volatilities (1.5% for Austria and 1.4% for France, but 2.2% for Sweden), and, last but not least, high
ratios of government income to GDP (49% for Austria and for France, 56% for Sweden): perhaps
not surprisingly governments that command a higher fraction of their countries GDP can borrow
more. These high maximum sustainable debt ratios are associated with relatively low maximum
default probabilities (0.58% for Austria, 0.53% for France, and 0.91% for Sweden). These reect the
5Note that even a halved disposable income to income ratio of 20% would still result in maximum debt ratios
of 112% for Austria, 111% for France, and 108% for Sweden, well above was is generally considered sustainable.
Importantly, sustainability is not the same as desirability; we return to that distinction in the Conclusion.
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assumption of growth lognormality, analytically tractable as well as empirically warranted to some
extent. Not all countries have high maximum sustainable debt levels and low default probabilities:
Argentinas maximum sustainable debt level is 61% of GDP, reecting the countrys high growth
volatility (6%) and low ratio of government income to GDP (28%); its mean growth rate over the
period 1980-2011 was 2.5%. Argentinas maximum default probability is 3.01%, indicating that
(relatively) low maximum sustainable debt levels may nonetheless be associated with (relatively)
high maximum default probabilities.
Actual debt ratios are generally lower than maximum sustainable debt levels, reecting the
importance of the prospect of reelection. Thus, Austria, France, and Sweden had average debt
ratios 64%, 50%, and 55% of GDP, respectively, over the period 1980-2011, ending with 72%, 86%,
and 38% of GDP, respectively, in 2011. Associated default probabilities are essentially negligible.
We interpret our ndings as implying that a country whose actual debt ratio falls short of its
maximum sustainable debt ratio enjoys a margin of safety that a¤ords the country the discretion
to increase its debt to GDP ratio with little corresponding increase in its probability of default.
This may explain why France, as well as the UK (2011 debt ratio 82%, maximum debt ratio 148%)
and the US (2011 debt ratio 103%, maximum debt ratio 135%) have seen little if any increase in
their costs of borrowing despite rather dramatic recent increases in their debt ratios. Things are
very di¤erent once the margin of safety has been exhausted: Argentina had average debt ratio of
73% over the period 1980-2011, a mere 12% over its maximum sustainable level, yet the associated
default probability was 82%. The same is true of Japan for example, whose maximum sustainable
debt level is 106% of GDP with associated default probability 1.06%, but whose average debt ratio
was 117% of GDP, with associated default probability 96%. The marked asymmetry between the
probability of defaults very slow increase below the maximum sustainable debt level and very
fast increase above is a natural consequence of the trade-o¤ involved in computing the maximum
sustainable debt level under the assumption of lognormality: lenders equate the (infra)marginal
benet of increased repayment absent default with the marginal cost of an increased probability of
default; where default is lognormally distributed, cost equals benet around the point at which the
probability of default starts its dramatic increase; debt levels that exceed the maximum sustainable
level are therefore on or beyond that part of distribution where the probability of default increases
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very quickly.6 The contrasting experiences of Argentina, which has defaulted on its debt, and Japan,
which has not despite increasing its debt to 229% of GDP in 2011 (associated default probability
100%), suggest that our model captures only part of the debt phenomena at work.
As already noted, we replace the two assumptions of innite government horizon and strategic
default by the opposite assumptions of limited government horizon and default that occurs when
government income falls short of debt service requirementswhat Grossman and Van Huyck (1988)
call excusable default. We justify our decision on two grounds. First, we believe our assumptions
are, on some dimensions at least, more realistic than the alternative assumptions. Regarding the
length of the governments horizon, a theory of government debt predicated on the governments
concern with developments that occur beyond the governments term of o¢ce clearly is at odds
with the self-interest that Public Choice Theory for example attributes to government motives and
behavior. Less rigorously but perhaps no less tellingly, conventional wisdom often holds that a
governments horizon rarely extends beyond the next election, with the well-worn maxim Après
moi le déluge considered accurately to reect the attitude of the vast majority of governments in
power. Regarding default, a theory of default based on strategic considerations is not consistent
with Levy Yeyati and Panizzas (2011) evidence of governments extreme reluctance to default:
governments default when they have no realistic option of servicing their debt, not when they deem
the option to default to have a higher payo¤ than the option to service the debt. Levy Yeyati and
Panizza (2011) attribute governments reluctance to default to (i) governments desire to be seen
as engaging only in excusable default and (ii) governments fear of losing o¢ce upon default. Tomz
(2007) presents strong evidence that it is governments that engage in inexcusable defaultdefault
despite having income su¢cient for debt service that su¤er the costs of default. Borensztein and
Panizza (2008) and Malone (2011) nd that governments that default see a marked decline in their
prospects for reelection.7
Second, our assumptions make for simpler modeling than the alternative assumptions. Parsi-
mony therefore should favor our assumptions over the alternative, in case the former should make
possible the derivation of results no less satisfactory than those derived under the latter, at least
6To understand the intuition, it is helpful to represent the lognormal distribution by the succession of a very
moderately sloped ray ending some distance before the mean, a very steeply sloped line segment ending some distance
after the mean, and another very moderately sloped ray. The maximum sustainable debt level should be around the
intersection of the rst ray and the line segment, with higher debt levels being on the line segment or the second ray.
7For contrary evidence, see Foley-Fischer (2012).
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in so far as concerns our primary variable of interest, specically the level of government debt. Be-
sides simplicity, our assumptions may in fact facilitate obtaining the desired result. Surely, lenders
should be willing to lend more when default is excusable rather than strategic. Equilibrium levels
of debt under excusable default therefore should be higher than under strategic default, thereby
serving to attain the high levels of debt observed in practice. Our calibration results show this to
be indeed the case.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents
the model. Section 4 considers the case of a myopic government to obtain a countrys maximum
sustainable debt ratio. Section 5 extends the analysis to the case of a government whose concern
extends beyond the current term in o¢ce. Section 6 presents the data. Section 7 discusses the
results of the calibration. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature review
It is probably fair to say much of the recent literature on sovereign debt can be viewed as constituting
a very rich tapestry weaved on the loom of Eaton and Gersovitzs (EG, 1981) seminal work.8 Later
work has quantied, rened, and extended EGs predictions, and endogenized some of what had
been exogenous in EG. Thus Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008) have embedded the
basic EG framework into the setting of a small open economy to study the interactions of default
risk with output, consumption, the trade balance, interest rates, and foreign debt. Arellano (2008)
ascribes the countercyclicality of interest rates and the current account to incomplete nancial
contracts. As interest and principal payments cannot be made to depend on output, the incentive
to default is higher in recessions than in expansions. Interest rates consequently are lower in
expansions, thereby inducing countries to borrow more when output is high. Borrowing nances
imports, which deteriorate the current account. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) incorporate a trend
into the output process. They distinguish between the two cases of stable and volatile trends and
show that only in the latter case can observed default frequencies be replicated in calibration.
Where the trend in output is stable, there is little value to the insurance provided by access to
international debt markets. A borrower in recession therefore has a strong incentive to default.
8The present literature review is by necessity rather limited in scope. For extensive literature reviews, see Panizza,
Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer (2009), Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009), and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006).
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The interest rate schedule consequently is extremely steep and borrowing does not extend to the
range where default occurs. Where in contrast the trend in output is volatile, insurance is valuable
and the incentive to default is weakened. The interest rate schedule is less steep and borrowing
extends to the range where default occurs.
Mendoza and Yue (2012) have endogenized output and the collapse in output that accompanies
default. Theirs is a general equilibrium model in which domestic rms borrow internationally to
nance their purchase of foreign inputs. A sovereign default jeopardizes rms access to foreign
working capital loans, thereby forcing the rms to substitute domestic inputs for the previously
purchased foreign inputs. As the former are imperfect substitutes for the latter, TFP declines and
the e¤ects of the negative output shock that triggered default are amplied. Cuadra and Sapriza
(2008) have considered the role of political risk. They show that political instability (one party
may lose power to another party) and political polarization (di¤erent parties represent di¤erent
constituents with di¤ering interests) combine to increase borrowing by decreasing the importance
a party in power attaches to the future. The negative consequences of borrowing are lessened when
shared with another party that has other constituents. A positive consequence of borrowing is to
tie the other partys hands, thereby preventing that party from lavishing its constituents with
debt-nanced favors should the party come to power.9
Yue (2009) and Benjamin and Wright (2009) have considered the role of renegotiation in default.
Yue (2009) considers Nash bargaining under symmetric information. Disagreement payo¤s are zero
for creditors and the autarkic payo¤ for the defaulting country. Yue (2009) shows that the parties
bargain to a reduced level of debt that does not depend on the defaulting countrys original debt:
the parties let bygones be bygones. Haircuts therefore are increasing in the defaulting countrys
debt. They are decreasing in the countrys output: countercyclical interest rates increase the payo¤
for the country to rejoining international debt markets; they increase the bargaining surplus that
is shared by the parties. Benjamin and Wright (2009) note that the period to the resolution of
default extends over many years. They attribute the delay in default resolution to the requirement
that the defaulting countrys commitment to servicing post-resolution debt be credible. As the
incentive to default generally decreases in output, credibility requires that the defaulting countrys
9Our analysis in Section 5 shares much with that of Cuadra and Sapriza (2008), but not the assumptions of
strategic default or innite government horizon.
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output recovers from the low level that likely prompted default in the rst place. This is often
a protracted process. That the country emerges from default only after output has recovered
provides an explanation for the otherwise puzzling observation that default resolution often results
in post-resolution debt that is no lower than the original, pre-default debt.
Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) have considered the role
of debt maturity: when not all debt is retired every period, the issuance of new debt serves to dilute
the value of existing debt; lack of commitment creates a prisoners dilemma that results in increased
government borrowing at higher interest rates. While short-term debt therefore should dominate
long-term debt, this need not be true where self-fullling rollover crises may occur (Chatterjee and
Eyigungor, 2012). Fink and Scholl (2011) have considered the role of conditionality. They show
that international nancial institution (IFI) involvement may increase rather than decrease interest
rates, by inducing additional borrowing on the part of a government that expects to benet from
IFI support.
Cohen and Villemot (2013) have noted the di¢culty of existing models simultaneously to match
the rst moments of debt and default probabilities: high default costs that make possible the
matching of debt ratios preclude that of default probabilities; low default costs have the opposite
e¤ect.10 Building on Levy Yeyati and Panizzas (2011) nding that output contractions generally
precede rather than follow default, Cohen and Villemot (2013) have developed a model in which the
cost of default is borne in advance. Governments in such case do not have the incentive to stave
o¤ a default whose cost they have already borne. As already noted, our work departs from the EG
assumptions: there is neither strategic default nor innite government horizon in our model.11
We conclude the present section by noting that, unlike the assumption of strategic default, the
assumption of excusable default is not subject to the well-known Bulow-Rogo¤ critique (Bulow and
Rogo¤, 1989a, 1989b), whereby exclusion from debt markets alone fails to deter default because a
defaulting government can use the amount otherwise to be reimbursed to purchase an insurance
contract that provides the same risk sharing as does government borrowing. A government that
10See in particular Table 1 in Cohen and Villemot (2013).
11Some previous work has maintained one but not the other EG assumption. For example, Catão and Kapur
(2004) maintain the assumption of strategic default but dispense with that of innite horizon. They focus on the
e¤ect of macroeconomic volatility on government debt. Conversely, Bi and Leeper (2012) maintain the assumption
of innite horizon but dispense with that of strategic default. They characterize the scal limit that arises from the
dynamic La¤er curve.
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has excusably defaulted has no income with which to purchase the insurance contract. It further
stands to lose o¢ce.
3 The model
Assume for simplicity a governments term in o¢ce lasts a single year and consider a government
that is in o¢ce in year t. Let yt denote the governments disposable income in year t; bt denote the
proceeds from issuing debt in year t, expressed as a fraction of government disposable income yt; dt
denote the face value of that debt, again expressed as a fraction of government disposable income
yt but payable in year t + 1; g denote the gross rate of growth in government disposable income,
from yt to yt+1, distributed ln (g)  N
 
; 2
  F (g), f (g)  F 0 (g); and r denote the risk-free
interest rate.12 The maximum amount the government can borrow is
btyt =
Pr [(1 + bt+1) yt+1 > dtyt] dtyt +
R dtyt=(1+bt+1)
0 yt+1dF (yt+1)
1 + r
(1)
Default occurs in year t + 1 when the sum of government disposable income in year t + 1 (yt+1)
and the amount the new government can borrow in that year (bt+1yt+1) is not su¢cient to service
the debt raised in year t (dtyt). We assume lenders can appropriate the entirety of government
disposable income in default, but that no new borrowing is possible in such case: lenders do not
throw good money after bad; there is a sudden stop.13 This is unlike the case of no-default, in
which proceeds from new borrowing can be used to service existing debt. There is thus a bubble-
like property to government debt: the debt the government can raise in year t, btyt, depends on
the debt the government can raise in year t+ 1, bt+1yt+1.
Rearranging (1), we have
bt =
1
1 + r
"
Pr

yt+1
yt
>
dt
1 + bt+1

dt +
Z dtyt=(1+bt+1)
0
yt+1
yt
dF (yt+1)
#
=
1
1 + r
"
Pr

g >
dt
1 + bt+1

dt +
Z dt=(1+bt+1)
0
gdF (g)
#
(2)
12We distinguish between government (total) income and government disposable income and express debt as a
fraction of the latter because even the most creditor-harried governments are unlikely to allocate all income to debt
servicing. While a government can and generally will cut non-debt servicing spending to avoid defaulting on its debt,
it is di¢cult to envision a government reducing all spending on defense, education, health, and law and order to zero.
13We assume without loss of generality that default lasts only a single period.
8
Denoting xt  dt= (1 + bt+1) the minimum growth rate necessary to avoid default in year t+1, (2)
becomes
bt =
1
1 + r

xt [1  F (xt)] (1 + bt+1) +
Z xt
0
gdF (g)

(3)
Using the lognormality of F (:) and dening
zt  ln (xt)  

(4)
we can rewrite (3) as14
bt =
e
1 + r

ezt (1 + bt+1) [1  (zt)] + e
2
2 (zt   )

(5)
where (:) denotes the standard normal cdf.
We have thus far assumed that the funds at the governments disposal in year t, yt+btyt, su¢ce
to service the debt dt 1yt 1 that the government has inherited from the government that was in
o¢ce in year t   1 (recall that a government remains in o¢ce only a single term, that is, only a
single year): yt + btyt > dt 1yt 1. If that should not be the case, and if yt + btyt < dt 1yt 1, then
the government defaults during its term of o¢ce in year t: We assume that the government loses
o¢ce upon default. This assumption plays no role in Section 4, but will play an important role in
Section 5.
4 Myopic government and maximum sustainable debt
Consider a myopic government whose horizon does not extend beyond its current term in o¢ce,
perhaps because it is all but certain to lose power at the next election. The government naturally
raises all the debt it can: the government need not concern itself with defaultexcept insofar
as default a¤ects the amount the government can borrowbecause it will not be in o¢ce to be
confronted with the consequences of default.15 We dene maximum sustainable borrowing to be
14To transform (3) into (5), rewrite xt as exp (+ zt), F (xt) as  ((ln (xt)  ) =) =  (zt), and
R xt
0
gdF (g) asZ xt
0
gd

ln (g)  


=
Z zt
 1
exp (+ zg) d (zg) = e
+
2
2  (zt   )
where zg  (ln (g)  ) =.
15Recall from Section 3 that debt has maturity one period.
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the maximum amount the government can borrow on a sustained basis, and maximum sustainable
debt the corresponding amount owed by the government.
A myopic government maximizes present borrowing bt given lenders expectation of future bor-
rowing bt+1
16
bt = max
z
e
1 + r

ezt (1 + bt+1) [1  (zt)] + e
2
2 (zt   )

  (bt+1) (6)
A Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) is a sequence of bts that satises bt =  (bt+1). All
REE are unbounded, except maximum sustainable borrowing bt = bt+1 = bM with bM =  (bM ).
17
We therefore seek the xed point
bM = max
z
B (bM ; z) (7)
where
B (bM ; z)  e

1 + r

ez (1 + bM ) [1  (z)] + e
2
2 (z   )

(8)
We show18
Proposition 1 If E [g] < 1 + r,  (b) = maxz B (b; z) is a contraction mapping and (7) has a
unique xed point, bM .
The result recalls the condition for the convergence of a growing dividend stream: only a
su¢ciently high interest rate precludes the mortgaging of all future disposable income. Figure 1
shows the determination of bM graphically. The condition E [g] < 1 + r ensures that the slope of
 (b) remains below unity; there is no intersection between the curve and the line beyond bM .
We denote zM  argmaxz B (bM ; z) and show
Proposition 2 Maximum sustainable government borrowing bM is increasing in the mean growth
rate , decreasing in growth rate volatility  for zM < 0, and decreasing in the risk-free interest
rate r. The corresponding probability of default (zM ) is decreasing in the mean growth rate ,
increasing in growth rate volatility  for zM < 0, and decreasing in the risk-free interest rate r.
16For simplicity, we refer to bt as borrowing rather than borrowing as a fraction of government disposable income,
more exact but also longer. We likewise refer to dt as debt.
17We use the subscript M for maximum.
18All proofs are in the Appendix.
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The results are intuitive. A government that is expected to see its disposable income grow
faster can borrow more, for it is expected to have more income with which to service its debt. In
contrast, a government whose disposable income growth is more volatile can borrow less, for the
greater likelihood of low income realizations increases the probability of default, thereby decreasing
lenders willingness to lend to the government.19 A government can borrow less when the risk-free
interest rate is high, for a high risk-free rate raises lenders opportunity cost of lending to the risky
government, thereby decreasing lenders willingness to lend to the government. The higher risk-
free rate increases the interest rate the government must pay on its debt (see Proposition 4 below),
thereby increasing the probability of default.
What is true of the probability of default at maximum sustainable borrowing extends to the
probability of default at any level of borrowing. Consider a government that will owe dyt in period
t+ 1 as a result of having borrowed byt in period t. Denote (z) the corresponding probability of
default. We have
Proposition 3 The probability of default (z) is decreasing in the mean growth rate , increasing
in growth rate volatility  for z < 0, and increasing in the risk-free interest rate r.
By analogy to maximum sustainable borrowing bM , we dene maximum sustainable debt dM .
Denoting zM = argmaxz B (bM ; z) and xM = exp (+ zM ), we have from xt  dt= (1 + bt+1)
dM = xM (1 + bM ) = exp (+ zM ) (1 + bM ) (9)
We further dene the interest rate R  dM=bM and the expected loss given default LGD. These
are20
R  dM
bM
=
exp (+ zM ) (1 + bM )
bM
=
exp (+ zM ) (zM )
 [1  (zM )] (10)
19More volatile disposable income growth also results in a greater likelihood of high income realizations. The
condition zM < 0 ensures that the detrimental e¤ect of volatility on debt dominates. It amounts to the reasonable
condition that the probability of default be less than 1=2.
20The last equality in (10) uses (1 + bM ) =bM =  (zM ) = f [1   (zM )]g from (21) in the Proof of Proposition 2.
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and21
LGD 
dMyt  
R dMyt=(1+bM )
0 yt+1
dF (yt+1)
F (dMyt=(1+bM ))
dMyt
= 1  E [exp (zg) jzg < zM ]
exp (zM ) (1 + bM )
(11)
We show
Proposition 4 Maximum sustainable debt dM is increasing in the mean growth rate  and de-
creasing in the risk-free interest rate r for zM < 0. The interest rate R is increasing in the risk-free
interest rate r for zM < 0.
Not all comparative statics can be determined because the direct e¤ects of , , and r on dM ,
R, and LGD often are often counteracted by their indirect e¤ects through zM or bM . Consider for
example maximum sustainable debt dM , which intuition and the result @bM=@ < 0 in Proposition
2 suggest should be decreasing in growth rate volatility . That such is not the case is due to
the o¤setting role of the probability of default (zM ), the increase in which requires an increase
in debt to be repaid absent default dM as compensation for the larger probability of default in
which partial payment only is received. Similar considerations apply to the interest rate R and the
expected loss given default LGD.
5 Beyond the current term
We now consider the case where a government serving its rst term in o¢ce has, in the absence of
default, an exogenous probability  of winning the next election. Should it win that election, the
government will serve another term in o¢ce, at the end of which it will again have an exogenous
probability  of winning the next election, again in the absence of default. The government loses
o¢ce upon default. Our purpose in the present section is to examine how the prospect of reelection
and the likelihood of further terms in o¢ce alters the governments borrowing as compared to the
case of a myopic government that serves a single term only.
Consider a government that has inherited debt dt 1yt 1 and has disposable income yt in year
21The equality in (11) is derived in the Appendix.
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t. The government has value function V (:) such that
V (dt 1yt 1; yt) = max
bt
u (yt + btyt   dt 1yt 1) + 
1 + r
E [V (dtyt; yt+1)] (12)
where u (:) denotes the governments utility function.22 The government recognizes that its choice
of borrowing in year t, btyt, determines the debt it owes in year t+1, dtyt. The expectation is over
g as yt+1 = ytg.
In order to make our problem tractable, we assume that the government has CRRA utility with
RRA coe¢cient a
u (c) =
c1 a
1  a (13)
This makes the value function similarly CRRA with RRA coe¢cient a
V (dt 1yt 1; yt) = V

dt 1
yt 1
yt
; 1

y1 at  v
 
d0t 1

y1 at (14)
where d0t 1  dt 1 (yt 1=yt) represents the debt the government owes in year t, expressed as a
fraction not of disposable income in year t   1 in which the debt was raised, but as a fraction of
disposable income in year t in which the debt is to be repaid. Put di¤erently, d0t 1yt = dt 1yt 1 is
the debt owed in year t as repayment for the amount bt 1yt 1 borrowed in year t  1.
Problem (12) can be rewritten23
v
 
d0t 1

= max
bt
u
 
1 + bt   d0t 1

+

1 + r
E

g1 av

dt
g

(15)
By analogy to (1) in Section 4, note that the relation between bt (fraction borrowed) and dt (fraction
owed) is given by
btyt =
Pr [(1 + bM ) yt+1 > dtyt] dtyt +
R dtyt=(1+bM )
0 yt+1dF (yt+1)
1 + r
(16)
Equation (16) di¤ers from (1) in replacing bt+1 by bM : the assumption of excusable default implies
22Note that there was no need to introduce the governments utility function in Section 5, because the single term
of o¢ce implied that the government would maximize borrowing regardless of its specic utility function.
23Divide (12) by y1 at and use (13) and (14). The condition for the existence and uniqueness of the value function
v (:) can be shown to be E

g1 a

< 1 + r.
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that the government will borrow as much as it can in order to stave o¤ default.24 Dening x 
d= (1 + bM ), the stationary REE satises
v
 
d0

= max
x
u
 
1 +B (x)  d0+ 
1 + r
E

g1 av

(1 + bM )x
g

(17)
where
B (x)  1
1 + r

x [1  F (x)] (1 + bM ) +
Z x
0
gdF (g)

(18)
denotes government borrowing as a fraction of government disposable income. Note the similarity
between (3) in Section 4 and (18). Indeed, the solutions x, b  B (x), and d reduce to xM , bM ,
and dM for  = 0.
Further insights into (17) may be gained by examining the relation between d0 (debt to be
repaid in the current period as a fraction of current period government disposable income, old
debt) and d = x (1 + bM ) (debt to be repaid in the next period as a fraction of current period
government disposable income, new debt), shown in Figures 1 and 2, for the two cases of risk-
neutral government (a = 0) and risk-averse government (a > 0), respectively. Under risk-neutrality
(Figure 2), the government maximizes the present value of a stream of disposable income that ends
either with default or with the failure to be reelected. A government that expects to be reelected
with certainty absent default ( = 1) nds it benecial to decrease the probability of default to
zero, thereby receiving the entire stream with certainty. Where debt owed in the current period is
less than current disposable income (d0 < 1), the government repays that old debt in its entirety
and raises no new debt (d = 0), thereby achieving the desired decrease of the default probability to
zero. As debt owed increases beyond current disposable income (d0 > 1), the government is forced
to borrow anew (d > 0) in order to service the debt it owes. The probability of default is as low
as can be given debt owed. Maximum debt (d = dM ) is attained where debt owed equals the sum
of current disposable income and maximum amount that can be borrowed (d0 = 1 + bM ). The
government defaults beyond. Where there is some non-zero probability that the government loses
the next election ( < 1), the government is now willing to borrow in the present period (d = d):
it enjoys the benets of such borrowing with probability one, yet will be confronted with its costs
with probability less than one, for it will be voted out of o¢ce with probability greater than zero.
24Corollary 1 below shows that maximum sustainable borrowing remains at bM .
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Again, there are circumstances (d0 > d0) where the government borrows more than it otherwise
deems desirable (d > d), just for the purpose of staving o¤ default.
Under risk-aversion (Figure 3), the government wishes to equalize the marginal utility of income
across periods, net of debt proceeds and repayments. The expectation of growing disposable income
( > 0) implies that there is always some borrowing (d > 0), in order to bring forward in time some
of that disposable income growth. As in the case of risk-neutrality, borrowing is lowest where the
probability of reelection is highest at unity ( = 1), for there no opportunity for the government to
escape being confronted with default through electoral defeat in such case. New debt (d) increases
in old debt (d0), as the government seeks to make up through new debt for old debts higher claim
on current disposable income. Again, there is default where old debt is larger than the sum of
current disposable income and maximum amount that can be borrowed (d0 = 1 + bM ).
We show
Proposition 5 Government borrowing b  B (x), debt owed d  x (1 + bM ), and the probabil-
ity of default F (x) decrease in the probability of reelection .
Corollary 1 b 6 bM , d
 6 dM , and F (x
) 6 F (xM ) for  > 0 with equality at  = 0.
The intuition is simple: the government values further terms in o¢ce, which it would forego in
case it were to default; the government therefore decreases the probability of default by decreasing
the amount it borrows. The higher the probability of reelection, the higher the expected value of
further terms in o¢ce, and the greater therefore the incentive to decrease the probability of default
by decreasing borrowing.
6 Data
We use country GDP data from IMF statistics to compute mean growth in GDP  and volatility
 over the period 1980-2011. There are 186 countries and 32 years, but countries that came into
existence during that period naturally have data for fewer years. South Sudan for example has
GDP data for the single year 2011 in which it became independent. Other countries have missing
data because of wars (Afghanistan, Iraq) or other, much less tragic but also less obvious reasons
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(Malta for example has GDP data for 12 years). The same issues arise for the values of the debt-
to-GDP and government income-to-GDP ratios, also obtained from IMF statistics. There are no
estimates of the probability of reelection , nor of the ratio of government disposable income to
government income. We keep our analysis of the former on a qualitative level and, in a rough and
ready way, conjecture the former to be around 0.4. In other words, we conjecture that a maximum
of 60% of government income is allocated to essential spending that cannot be cut, at least not on
a sustainable basis; government debt is therefore serviced out of the remaining 40% of government
income.25 We use the mean US 30-year bond yield over the period for the risk-free interest rate r.
In view of Proposition 1, we exclude those countries for which E [g] > 1 + r.
The data for selected countries is shown in Table 1. There is a wide range of debt ratios, as
well as mean growth rates and volatilities. The country with the lowest average debt ratio over the
period 1980-2011 was Chile at 11%, followed by Australia at 20%. Chile retains its rst place in
2011, whilst Australia cedes its second place to Russia, which will be recalled to have defaulted on its
debt in 1998 and 1999. Other countries in our list that defaulted on or restructured their debt over
the period 1980-2011 are Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Iceland, Indonesia, Mexico,
Peru, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela, consistent with Reinhart and Rogo¤s
(2009) observation that sovereign defaults are a common occurrence. Default often results in a 2011
debt ratio that is lower than its 1980-2011 average. This is most clearly the case for Argentina,
whose debt ratio declined from a 1980-2011 average of 73% to 45% in 2011, and Indonesia, where
the decline was from 49% to 24%. It is not only defaulting countries that saw their debt ratios
decline: Belgium saw its debt to GDP ratio decline from a 1980-2001 average of 109% to 97%,
Sweden from 55% to 38%; Denmark, Israel, New Zealand, and Switzerland saw somewhat smaller
declines. Most industrialized countries saw their debt ratios increase, though, most notably Greece
(from 85% to 165%), Japan (from 118% to 229%), and, on a smaller yet still sizeable scale, Iceland
(from 45% to 99%), the United Kingdom (from 46% to 82%), and the United States (from 65% to
103%).
In line with Catão and Kapurs (2004) argument and ndings, countries with more volatile
growth rates tend to have lower debt ratios. The countries with volatility equal to or greater
than 6% are Argentina (6.00%), Peru (6.10%), Russia (6.84%), Ukraine (10.59%), and Venezuela
25As noted in the Introduction, the overall gist of our results remains where the 0.4 ratio is halved.
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(6.77%). Argentinas 1980-2011 average excluded, these countries have had low debt ratios, ranging
from Russias 12% to Venezuelas 47%, both in 2011. There are many countries with equally low
debt ratios, though, despite having markedly less volatile growth rates. South Africa for example
has volatility 2.41% yet debt ratio 39% in 2011, only slightly above Ukraines 36% in that same
year. This may reect the ambiguous e¤ect of volatility on debt, as well as the inuence of other
factors.26
Not least among these other factors is the ratio of government income to GDP. By and large,
countries for which that ratio is higher tend to have higher debt ratios. Returning to our comparison
of South Africa and Ukraine, note that the former has government income to GDP ratio of 27%, the
latter of 39%: Ukraines government can command more of its countrys GDP than can its South
African counterpart; it correspondingly can borrow more. Another factor is the mean growth rate.
The result @dM=@ > 0 from Proposition 4 notwithstanding, slower growing countries tend to have
higher debt ratios.27 Still, the slowest growing country, the Ukraine at -0.8%, has a relatively low
debt ratio of 36% in 2011; the fastest growing country, Vietnam at 6.3%, has a moderate debt ratio
of 50% in 2011. Yet another factor a¤ecting debt ratios is the probability of reelection. Whilst
little quantitative can be said, note that democracies, whose governments presumably have shorter
expected terms in o¢ce, tend to have higher debt ratios; this is rather consistent with Proposition
5.
7 Calibration results
Table 1 shows the calibration of maximum sustainable debt dM . Note that two countries, Greece
and Japan, have actual debt levels that are well in excess of their respective dM . Such discrepancy
may at least partially account for Greeces 2011 default; it suggests that further debt writedowns
may be in order. That there have been no similar developments in Japan is, to us at least, a matter
of some surprise.28 An obvious question is how a country can borrow well above its maximum
26That volatility has an ambiguous e¤ect on debt is suggested by our failure to sign @dM=@ in Section 4. This
(non-)result is only suggestive as it pertains to maximum sustainable debt dM rather than actual debt considered in
the present section.
27As for our failure to sign @dM=@, the result @dM=@ > 0 is only suggestive, for it too pertains to maximum
sustainable debt dM rather than actual debt.
28We realize Japan is on many counts a special case, not least because its large private savings are invested
overwhelmingly if indirectly in Japan Government Bonds. It is nonetheless di¢cult to view Japans current debt
levels and policies as sustainable (Hoshi, 2011; Hoshi and Ito, 2012).
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sustainable debt level. One does not have to agree with our exact calculation of dM to believe
that a country must have some maximum sustainable debt ratio; any mistake in our calculation
of dM would have to be very large indeed for that sustainable ratio to be in the range of Greece
and Japans actual debt ratios. One possible answer is deceptive statistics: Greece is said to have
falsied its debt numbers for the better part of a decade.29 This answer does not apply to Japan.
Another is a large currency devaluation that inates foreign debt in local currency terms, or a large
negative shock to GDP. Again, this does not apply to Japan. It does, however, apply to many of
the countries that defaulted over the 1980-2011 period we consider.
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) provide detailed case studies of the defaults of Argentina,
Ecuador, Russia, Ukraine, and Uruguay, The e¤ect of is local currency devaluation is most clearly
seen in Uruguay. In June 2002, in no small part in response to Argentinas 2001 default and the
Argentine pesos ensuing devaluation, Uruguay oated the Uruguayan peso. A 50% devaluation
followed, which, by Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyers (2006) calculation, accounted for more than
half the increase in Uruguays debt-to-GDP ratio from 54% at end 2001 to 94% at end 2002.30
With Uruguays dM at 80%, what had been a very comfortable debt ratio (near zero probability of
default at 54% debt ratio) became a very heavy burden (rather coincidentally, 94% probability of
default at 94% debt ratio). Uruguay defaulted in May 2003.
Uruguays default occurred after it had devalued. In contrast, Argentinas default occurred
before it abandoned its peg to the US dollar, suggesting that not only the reality but also the
expectation of a devaluation that would increase the debt ratio beyond its sustainable level may
su¢ce to trigger default. At least since the devaluation of the Brazilian real in 1999, Argentinas
peso had been under pressure, with several analysts questioning the viability of its peg to the US
dollar. When Argentina defaulted on December 24, 2001, its debt-to-GDP ratio was 53%, well
below its dM at 61%. Yet, within slightly more than a month, the peso was devalued; it was to go
from parity with the dollar to a ratio of 3.7:1 in the space of six months, before settling down at
around 3:1. This decline was reected in Argentinas debt-to-GDP ratio, which was to increase to
150% at end 2002; Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) attribute the bulk of this increase, 60%,
to the pesos devaluation. At 113% debt-to-GDP ratio, Argentinas default probability was 100%;
29See for example Story, Thomas, and Schwartz (2010).
30There was a concurrent 11% decline in GDP.
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investors were not mistaken in fearing that devaluation would result in near-certain default.31
Much the same phenomenon appears to be at work in the cases of Russia and Ecuador. In
Russia, whose dM is 72%, successive devaluations helped transform a debt-to-GDP ratio of 54%
(near zero default probability) at end 1997 into 68% (0.92% default probability) at end 1998 and
90% (92% default probability) at end 1999. The sharp fall in oil prices in the wake of the 1997 Asian
crisis decreased government revenues and may have prompted Russias default on its domestic debt
in August 1998. Russia concurrently conducted a rst devaluation, presumably because falling oil
prices limited the foreign currency available to defend the rubles peg. As noted by Sturzenegger
and Zettelmeyer (2006, p.104), the devaluation led to a sharp rise in the share of debt to GDP and
made it increasingly di¢cult to remain current on external debt payments. Russia was placed in
default on its external debt in January 1999. Between 1997 and 1999, the ruble had gone from an
average of 5.8 to the dollar to 24.6:1; it was to reach and remain in the high twenties for the next few
years. In Ecuador, which defaulted on its debt in January 1999, real depreciation contributed to
nearly two-thirds of the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio from 67% (near zero default probability)
at end 1998 to 101% (near certainty of default) at end 1999. Ecuadors dM is 79%.
Only in Ukraine did devaluation not play an important part in the countrys September 1998
default: Ukraines debt-to-GDP ratio was 33% in 1997 (near zero default probability), 37% in 1998
(near zero default probability), and its maximum sustainable value dM of 52.8% in 1999 (6.81%
default probability). Thus, we are able to account neither for Japans resilience to a debt-to-GDP
ratio well above its maximum sustainable value nor for Ukraines default at a debt-to-GDP ratio
at most equal to its maximum sustainable value.32
Maximum sustainable debt ratios vary widely across countries, as do these levels correspond-
ing default probabilities. Austria has the highest maximum sustainable debt ratio (224%), Peru
the lowest (44%); at their respective maximum sustainable debt ratios, Ukraine has the highest
probability of default (6.81%), France the lowest (0.54%). Consistently with Reinhart, Rogo¤, and
Sevastano (2003), di¤erent countries thus have di¤ering debt tolerance. Reinhart, Rogo¤, and Sev-
31We obtain 113% by adding to the initial debt-to-GDP ratio (53%) the increase that is attributable to devaluation
(60%) . We realize that causality runs in both directions, from default to devaluation as well as from devaluation
to default. Yet, it would be di¢cult to argue that devaluation would have been avoided had default not occured:
Argentina had a large trade decit which it was having di¢culty nancing; the pesos peg to the dollar was increasingly
being questioned.
32The 6.81% default probability at dM = 52:8% admittedly is not negligible. Still, Ukraines growth in 1998
(-1.9%) and 1999 (-0.2%) was not so low as to suggest that default was due to a low growth realization.
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astano (2003, p. 1) nd that debt-intolerant countries tend to have weak scal structures, Catão
and Kapur (2004) that they have higher macroeconomic volatility. Consistently with these nd-
ings, the maximum sustainable debt ratio dM is negatively correlated with growth rate volatility 
(correlation coe¢cient -0.75) and positively correlated with the ratio of government income to GDP
(correlation coe¢cient 0.81); in the spirit of Besley and Persson (2011), that ratio may be viewed
as a measure of the countrys scal strength.33 Interestingly, there is very little correlation between
the maximum sustainable debt ratio dM and the mean growth rate  (correlation coe¢cient -0.05):
the maximum sustainable debt ratio depends much more on the volatility of growth than on its
mean.34
Table 1 also shows the calibration of the minimum debt ratios dm, those that correspond to
the cases  = 1 and a  ! 0 in which, as argued in Section 5, a government wishes to minimize
borrowing in order not to jeopardize through default futures terms in o¢ce. That dm > 0 despite
 = 1 and a  ! 0 suggests either (i) that dm is discontinuous at a = 0 (compare d at d0 = 0 for
 = 1 in Figures 1 and 2) or (ii) that existing debt is such that even a government that wishes
completely to pay down debt is forced to engage in some borrowing in order service existing debt
(1 < d0 < 1 + bM in Figure 2). Every dm has associated default probability e¤ectively zero, as is
probably to be expected at the low levels that characterize dm. More surprisingly perhaps, country
default probabilities increases very slowly to reach default probabilities that for the most part are
quite reasonable at dM ; they then increase quasi exponentially. This can be seen in Table 1 for
Argentina, Greece, and Japan; it was already apparent in our calibration of default probabilities
at di¤erent debt levels in our discussion of the Argentine, Uruguayan, Russian, and Ecuadoran
defaults.35
To understand the asymmetry between the probability of defaults very slow increase below the
maximum sustainable debt level and very fast increase above, it is helpful to return to the rst-
order condition for government borrowing dM , which equates the marginal probability of default
33Besley and Persson (2011) associate state capability with the ability to raise taxes, income tax in particular.
34Note that the negative correlation between maximum sustainable debt dM and mean growth rate  does not nec-
essarily contradict the result @dM=@ > 0 from Proposition 4: the simple correlation fails to keep other determinants
of maximum sustainable debt constant.
35Again, Ukraine is a case apart.
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with the average probability of repayment.36 That the lognormal distribution has monotone hazard
rate implies that the marginal probability is larger than the average for d > dM and smaller for
d < dM . It is therefore the case that the average probability of default increases in d for d > dM
and decreases for d < dM . The total probability of default naturally increases in d, but the average
probabilitys contrasting variation for d 7 dM implies that the total probability increases slowly for
d < dM (the increase in the total is slowed down by the decrease in the average) and rapidly for
d > dM (the increase in the total is accelerated by the increase in the average). The asymmetry
is compounded by the very low volatility of growth, which make the lognormal distribution rather
at for low d (d < dM ) and very steep for d around the mean (d > dM ).
In summary, a country whose actual debt ratio falls short of its maximum sustainable debt ratio
enjoys a margin of safety that a¤ords the country the discretion to increase its debt to GDP ratio
with little corresponding increase in its probability of default. The probability of default climbs
precipitously once the margin of safety has been exhausted.
8 Conclusion
We have shown that a reversal of the prevailing assumptions on government behavior regarding
sovereign debt can deliver valuable new insights. Specically, the assumptions that governments
have limited horizons and default only when unable to service their debt has made it possible
to calibrate debt ratios that are markedly closer to prevailing levels than may thus far has been
the case. The assumption that a government is myopicconcerned only with its current term in
o¢cehas served to introduced the concept of maximum sustainable debt, which can be viewed as
a measure of Reinhart, Rogo¤, and Sevastanos (2003) debt (in)tolerance. Di¤erent countries have
di¤ering debt tolerances, which depend on these countries output volatilities (Catão and Kapur,
2004) and these countries governments tax raising abilities (Reinhart, Rogo¤, and Sevastano,
2003). The recognition that governments horizons may be extended beyond the current term by
the prospect of reelection has provided a rationale for actual debt ratios below their maximum
36Formally and neglecting for simplicity recovery in default, dM satises
1
1 + bM
f

dM
1 + bM

=
1  F

dM
1+bM

dM
21
sustainable levels. This creates a margin of safety that allows a government if necessary to increase
the debt level to the maximum sustainable ratio with little corresponding increase in the probability
of default.
Our positive paper has normative implications. In particular, it implies that, for those countries
that have recently experienced dramatic increases in their debt ratios yet have experienced little to
no increase in their borrowing costs (France, UK, US), the present benign situation may not last,
if the increase in these countries debt ratios were to continue beyond their maximum sustainable
levels. Our estimates of these levels are of course subject to considerable uncertainty, as they
rely on assumptions that by necessity can be justied only partially, but the marked asymmetry
in the relation between the debt ratio and the default probability before and after the maximum
sustainable debt ratio does not depend on these assumptions. There is thus a point beyond which
even a small increase in the debt ratio will have a large e¤ect on the default probability, thus on
the countrys cost of debt.37
Conversely, our paper implies that, for those countries that have seen a dramatic increase in
their cost of debt despite having debt ratios well short of their maximum sustainable levels (Italy,
Spain), it is at least conceivable that nancial markets may have overreacted. Absent any dramatic
increase in these countries growth volatility or decrease in their governments tax raising abilities,
it is not entirely clear why these countries should have experienced such large increases in borrowing
costs as they did. Whilst Spains future growth rate in all likelihood will be lower than its past
rate, recall from Section 7 that the e¤ect of the expected growth rate on the maximum sustainable
debt ratio is weak in calibration. In view of government debts bubble-like property, whereby
present borrowing depends on the expectation of future borrowing, perhaps the answer lies in the
coordination problems analyzed by Morris and Shin (2004), Rochet and Vives (2004), and, closer
to the present analysis, Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012).
37A more sanguine view may of course be suggested by the Japanese experience.
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Appendix
Derivation of (11) To obtain the equality in (11), observe that
LGD 
dMyt  
R dMyt=(1+bM )
0 yt+1
dF (yt+1)
F (dMyt=(1+bM ))
dMyt
= 1 
R dMyt=(1+bM )
0
yt+1
yt
dF (yt+1)
F (dMyt=(1+bM ))
dM
= 1 
R dM=(1+bM )
0 g
dF (g)
F (dM=(1+bM ))
dM
= 1 
R xM
0 g
dF (g)
F (xM )
xM (1 + bM )
= 1 
R xM
0 g
d

ln(g) 




(ln(xM ) )


xM (1 + bM )
= 1 
R zM
 1
exp (+ zg)
d(zg)
(zM )
exp (+ zM ) (1 + bM )
= 1  E [exp (zg) jzg < zM ]
exp (zM ) (1 + bM )
where, as in footnote 14, zg  (ln (g)  ) =.
Proof of Proposition 1 We proceed in two steps. In the rst step, we show that B (b; z) has a
unique maximum over z. In the second step, we show that  (b) is a contraction mapping.
Step 1 Di¤erentiate B (b; z) in (8) with respect to z to obtain
@B (b; z)
@z
=
e
1 + r

ez (1 + b) [ [1  (z)]   (z)] + e
2
2  (z   )

(19)
Now use
e
2
2  (z   ) = 1p
2
exp

 1
2
z2 + z

= ez (z)
to conclude that @B (b; z) =@z has the same sign as (1 + b) bL (z), where L (z)   (z) = [1  (z)]
denotes the likelihood ratio of the standard normal distribution. As L (z) increases monoton-
ically from L ( 1) = 0 to L (+1) = +1, it is clear that @B (b; z) =@z = 0 at the point
z = L 1 ( (1 + 1=b)), which constitutes the unique maximand of B (b; z).
Step 2 Consider b1 < b2. Noting from (8) that  (b)  maxz B (b; z) is increasing in b, we have
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 (b1) 6  (b2). Moreover,
 (b2) = max B (b2; z)
=
e
1 + r
max

ez (1 + b2) [1  (z)] + e
2
2 (z   )

=
e
1 + r
max

ez [(1 + b1) + (b2   b1)] [1  (z)] + e
2
2 (z   )

6
e
1 + r
max

ez (1 + b1) [1  (z)] + e
2
2 (z   )

+
e
1 + r
max ez (b2   b1) [1  (z)]
=  (b1) +
e
1 + r
max ez (b2   b1) [1  (z)]
where the inequality is due to the general inequalitymaxz ff (z) + g (z)g 6 maxz ff (z)g+maxz fg (z)g.
We therefore have
0 6  (b2)   (b1) 6 e

1 + r
max ez (b2   b1) [1  (z)]
Lemma 1
max e+z [1  (z)] 6 E [g] = exp

+
2
2

Proof of Lemma 1
e+z [1  (z)] =
Z z
 1
e+zd(zg)
6
Z z
 1
e+zgd(zg)
=
Z x
 1
gdF (g)
6 E [g]
where we have used the same transformation as in footnote (14) with x = exp (+ z). The result
is true for all z; it is therefore true for the z that maximizes e+z [1  (z)].
From Lemma 1 and the assumption E [g] < 1 + r, there exists k < 1 such that for all b1 < b2
0 6  (b2)   (b1) 6 k (b2   b1) . (20)
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The function  (b) is therefore a contraction and has a unique xed point. We denote that point
bM .
Proof of Proposition 2 Di¤erentiate bM =  (bM ) with respect to  2 f; ; rg to obtain
@bM
@
=  0 (bM )
@bM
@
+
@ (bM )
@
, 1   0 (bM ) @bM
@
=
@ (bM )
@
Use  0 (bM ) < 1 ( (b) being a contraction mapping) to conclude that sign f@bM=@g = sign f@ (bM ) =@g.
From (8) and  (b)  maxz B (b; z), it is immediate that @ (b) =@ > 0 and @ (b) =@r < 0; it is
therefore the case that @bM=@ > 0 and @bM=@r < 0. From (8) and footnote (14), we have
@B (b; z)
@
=
e
1 + r

zez (1 + b) [1  (z)] +
Z z
 1
zg exp (zg) d(zg)

A su¢cient condition for @B (b; z) =@ < 0 is z < 0. At b = bM and z = zM , zM < 0 amounts to the
reasonable assumption that countries have probability of default (zM ) < 1=2 at their maximum
sustainable debt ratio. The intuitive result @bM=@ < 0 follows.
The FOC for zM is
@B (bM ; z)
@z

z=zM
=  (1 + bM ) [1  (zM )]  bM (zM ) = 0 (21)
It can be rewritten as
L (zM ) = 

1 +
1
bM

(22)
where L (z)   (z) = [1  (z)] denotes the hazard rate; L0 (z) > 0 as the normal distribution has
monotone hazard rate.38 Di¤erentiate (22) with respect to , , and r to obtain
L0 (zM )
@zM
@
=   
b2M
@bM
@
< 0 (23)
L0 (zM )
@zM
@
=
L (zM )

  
b2M
@bM
@
> 0 (24)
38A cdf F (x) with associated pdf f (x) has monotone hazard rate when f (x) = [1  F (x)] increases in x.
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and
L0 (zM )
@zM
@r
=   
b2M
@bM
@r
> 0 (25)
Proof of Proposition 3 Consider debt dyt due in period t+ 1. A government that engages only
in excusable default exhausts all t+ 1 borrowing possibilities, specically bMyt+1, before declaring
default. Default therefore occurs with probability
Pr [yt+1 + bMyt+1 < dyt] = Pr

g <
d
1 + bM

= 

ln (d)  ln (1 + bM )  


 (z)
where z is dened analogously to (4)
z  ln (d)  ln (1 + bM )  

Use @bM=@ > 0, @bM=@ < 0 for z < 0, and @bM=@r < 0, to conclude that @z=@ < 0, @z=@ > 0
for z < 0, and @z=@r > 0, respectively.
Proof of Proposition 4 Use (9) and (23) to write
@ ln (dM )
@
=
@bM
@
1 + bM
+ 1 + 
@zM
@
=
@bM
@

1
1 + bM
  
2
L0 (zM ) b2M

+ 1 (26)
Now use the denition of L (z) and (22) to write
L0 (zM ) =  zML (zM ) + L2 (zM )
= 
1 + bM
bM


1 + bM
bM
  zM

, L
0 (zM ) b
2
M
2
= (1 + bM )

1 + bM   zMbM


The assumption zM < 0 implies that L
0 (zM ) b
2
M=
2 > 1 + bM , in turn implying that the term in
square brackets on the RHS of (26) is positive; @ ln (dM ) =@ > 0 is then an immediate consequence
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of @bM=@ > 0 established in Proposition 2; @dM=@ > 0 follows.
Use (9) and (25) to write
@ ln (dM )
@r
=
@bM
@r
1 + bM
+ 
@zM
@r
=
@bM
@r

1
1 + bM
  
2
L0 (zM ) b2M

(27)
The term in square brackets on the RHS of (27) is identical to that in (26), which we have just shown
to be positive; @ ln (dM ) =@r < 0 is then an immediate consequence of @bM=@r < 0 established in
Proposition 2; @dM=@r < 0 follows.
Finally, use (10) to write
@ ln (R)
@r
= 
@zM
@r
+
L0 (zM )
L (zM )
@zM
@r
> 0
where we have used @zM=@r > 0 from Proposition 2 and L
0 (z) > 0; @R=@r > 0 follows.
Proof of Proposition 5 Di¤erentiate (15) with respect to x and d0, recall that x denotes the
optimal x, and use the Envelope Theorem to write
u0
 
1 +B (x)  d0B0 (x) + 
1 + r
E

(1 + bM )
ga
v0

(1 + bM )x

g

= 0 (28)
and
v0
 
d0

=  u0  1 +B (x)  d0 < 0 (29)
Note that (28) and (29) together imply B0 (x) > 0. Now use the Implicit Function Theorem to
conclude
sign

@x
@

= sign

1
1 + r
E

(1 + bM )
ga
v0

(1 + bM )x

g

=  1
The desired result follows from B0 (x) > 0, d = x (1 + bM ), and F
0 (x) > 0.
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